Audit fees, non-audit fees and auditor independence: evidence of public companies listed on BM&FBovespa
Name: WILLIAM BRASIL RODRIGUES SOBRINHO
Publication date: 14/10/2014
Advisor:
Name |
Role |
|---|---|
| PATRÍCIA MARIA BORTOLON | Advisor * |
Examining board:
| Name |
Role |
|---|---|
| JOSE ELIAS FERES DE ALMEIDA | Internal Examiner * |
| PATRÍCIA MARIA BORTOLON | Advisor * |
Summary: This paper aims to identify the determinants of audit and non-audit fees. Additionally aims to assess if the provision of these non-audit services in conjunction with audit of the financial statements affect the independence of the external auditors of Brazilian companies traded on the BM&FBovespa. The sample contains 180 non-financial corporations observed in the period 2010 to 2012.Results indicate that, overall, the effort and risk proxies raise audit fees, while corporate governance variables show the demand effect (raising fees) and risk effect (lowering fees) depending on the proxy observed. Regarding the hiring of non-audit services, firms that need more monitoring and have audit committees require additional services, although the fiscal board inhibits hiring these services. Finally, evidence indicates that the provision of non-audit services does not affect auditor's independence. These results are the
same even when considering the existence of a going concern opinion as a proxy for independence. Additional tests confirm the maintenance of the independence of the auditor, even when, type of auditor (non-Big4), unexpected non-audit services, possibility of modified opinion and the effect of best practices in corporate governance.
