RELAÇÃO ENTRE AGRESSIVIDADE FISCAL E O
NÍVEL DE INVESTIMENTO

Name: Rodolfo Fabriz Marchesi
Type: MSc dissertation
Publication date: 11/07/2019
Advisor:

Namesort descending Role
Eduardo José Zanoteli Advisor *

Examining board:

Namesort descending Role
ANTÔNIO ARTUR DE SOUZA External Examiner *
CARLOS ROBERTO VALLIM External Examiner *
Eduardo José Zanoteli Advisor *
Jose Elias Feres de Almeida Internal Examiner *

Summary: Fiscal aggressiveness practices, by increasing the companies cash flow, tend to free up
resources to be used to maintain the enterprises operating activities. Therefore, investigate the
effects in investment of tax aggressiveness as the objective of this research fills a gap in the
incipient Brazilian literature of tax avoidance, which brings utility for the stakeholders involved
in the financial market. Regarding this, the hypothesis supposes that companies which practice
more aggressive tax planning has a positive impact in the level of investment. The sample was
collected between the period of 2010-2017, and the year of 2009, for the lagged variables, with
the assets which had more than 80% of liquidity in the [B]³ stock market, using Comdinheiro
website dataset, and eventually the company websites to fill data through the financial
statements. The amount of observations totalized 247 companies, distributed among 11
economic sectors, with the total of 1344 observations. To test it, the software Stata was used to
apply the quantile regressions formulas, with additional tests for the fiscal aggressiveness
metrics GaapETR e BTD, when calculating dummies for these variables, which generated four
more models, as a way to give more robustness to the results. Thereby, we found that there isn’t
significance between investment and tax aggressiveness, in no one of the eight models
developed here. The conclusion is that tax aggressiveness isn’t associated with the level of
investment, rejecting the null hypothesis. However, it is accepted that fiscal aggressiveness is
related to non-tax costs, as well as the agency theory and conflicts of interest within the
company described by Stein (2003), which generate moral hazard problems and asymmetric
information, once that the results are consistent with those of previous studies.

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